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. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

EE\'EELr R.

Bux·ro01'

Applicant/Appellant,:

Case No.

15802

-vsINDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant/Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents agree generally with Appellants' statement
of the nature of the case.
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Respondents agree generally with Appellants' statement
of the disposition by the Industrial Commission.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the award of the Industrial
Commission dated December 12, 1977, affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree generally with Appellants' statement
of facts except the record does not indicate an increase of disability of Applicant over that awarded by the medical panel.
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POINT I.
THE RECORD DOES NOT INDICATE ANY
APPRECIABLE CHANGE IN APPLICANT'S DISABILITY FROM THE TIME OF THE MEDICAL
PANEL REPORT.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

Of the

Industrial Commission, as written by the Administrative Law
Judge, best summarizes the lack of evidence in the record of
increased disability of Applicant over the rating given in 1971
by the medical panel.

(R.

!

315, 316).

Dr. Hebertson did testify at the 19 75 Hearing that Appli·,
cant was permanently and totally disabled.
earlier letter,

He also wrote an

for the purpose of Applicant filing the appli-

cation for a hearing, in which he stated that

"It is my opinior.,

she is totally and permanetly disabled as a result of the industrial injury of February 15, 1966.

But, as the record in-

dicates almost no change in Applicant's condition in 1975 over
19 71 i t is reasonable to assume that Dr. Hebertson would have
considered Applicant permanently and totally disabled in 1971 at
the time the medical panel made their suggested award of 40 per·
cent disability as a result of the industrial accident in 1966.
In the numerous examinations of Applicant by Dr. Hebertsc·
he almost always noted that there was no change in her conditiu1
(R.

82, 113, 153, 171, 238, 239, 253, 259,

312, 314).

Andother

than a question as to what a myelogram taken April 21, 1972 in·
dicated there was nothing in the remaining examinations by or. '

I

Hebertson that indicated an increased disability over the years.i
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(R-190).

A followup rnyelogram in October of 1972 showed no

change and there was nothing said to indicate that there was
reason to believe there was an increased disability.
Applicant's Brief quotes Dr. Hebertson's testimony at the
hearing (R. 294, 295)
cant's disability.

as to the doctor's reasons for the Appli-

"I think that the disability is not only due

to the difficulty she has in the lurnbosacral region, but also the
difficulty which she has in terms of pain in the dorsal region,
and the deficits which have resulted as a result of her chordotomy
procedure in the dorsal region.

II

All three of these conditions were considered by the Medical Panel.

And the chordotomy, which was especially noted by the

doctor, was performed some two years before the panel met.
POINT II.
STATUTE OF TIME HAS RUN ON
APPLICATION

APPELLA..~T'S

Appellant is seeking permanent total disability because
any increase in permanent partial disability is disallowed by the
six year limitation of time.

(U.S. Smelting, Refining,and Mining

Company v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2 239).
If an applicant is precluded from maintaining an action
for increased perrnant partial disability it would seem futile in
the interest of justice to provide for an action for permanent
total disability.
The present eight year statute of limitations is not applicable in this case as the six year statute had already run
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Machine-generated

when the legislature made the change from six to eight yean.
Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, Ut. S. Crt., 1978, Docket #1521S.
CONCLUSION

Applicant received an award of permanent partial disabit:
from the Industrial Commission in 1971.

A medical panel reportt,

to the Commission after examining the applicant and the Cornmis·I
sion followed their recommendation.

I

Applicant filed many applications for different purposes I

since the award in 19 71, but never was application made for in-1
creased disability until 1975, nine years after the industrial
accident.
The record does not indicate any material change in
Applicant's disability from the 1971 award.
The judgment and decision of the Industrial Commission
sould be cor.f irmed.
Dated thisai.J_day of July, 1978.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15804

-vsKENNETH EUGENE GOTFREY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged by information with one
count of forcible sodomy (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (Supp.
1977)), two counts of rape (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (Sripp.
1977)), and two counts of forcible sexual abuse (Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-404 (Supp. 1977)).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury in the Seventh
Judicial District with the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, presiding.
The appellant was found guilty of one count of forcible sodomy
and two counts of rape on the 21st of March, 1978.

On March

22, 1978, appellant was given one sentence of one to fifteen
Years and two sentences of five years to life, all to be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Servicesin
and Technology
Act,State
administered
by the Utah State Library.
served concurrently
the Utah
Prison.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the
convictions.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The charges against the appellant involved three
instances of sexual abuse of his minor step-children.
first occurred on September 11, 1975.

The

Appellant's young

step-daughter, Petrita, testified that on that day appellant
jerked her into a bedroom in their mobile home, made her
take off her clothes, and then had intercourse with her
(T.60).

She was twelve years old at the time (T.4).

She

stated that, "he grabbed me by the arm and jerked me and
said if I didn't get in there, he was going to beat the
living heck out of me."

(T.6).

She testified that the same

thing happened 20 to 50 times before (T.7).
Appellant admitted being in his home with two of
his children on the evening of September 11, 1975, and t~at
his wife was not at home (T.157,158).

This was substantiated

by the testimony of appellant's wife (T.48).
Appellant's step-son indicated on cross-examination
that he had been in the home on occasions when appellant had
abused his step-daughters and that he had observed sexual
acts taking place between appellant and the girls (T. 71) ·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Carbon County Sheriff Albert Passic testified
that after appellant had been arrested on June 28th and
informed of his rights in the Sheriff's Office, appellant
stated in answer to the sheriff's questions that he had
"undressed and played with" the little girls but denied
having had sexual intercourse with them (T.103,104).
Brian Matsuda was a juvenile probation officer
who had been assigned to work with the victim's step-son
Michael (T.88).

Mr. Matsuda testified that on the evening

of the 27th of June, the night before appellant was taken
into custody, he visited the Gotfrey home (T.88).

He

indicated that the boy had told him of appellant's abuses
several days earlier (T.94), and that he was concerned for
the safety of the children (T.93).

Mr. Matsuda stated

that appellant was present that evening with his wife
(T.89), and that appellant at that time admitted having
intercourse with the girls but denied any abuse of the boy
(T. 9 0) •

Bobby Joe Fredrickson was a clinical psychologist
of the Four Corner Mental Health Clinic in Price (T.110).
He was not a licensed psychologist and never had been (T.111).
Mr. Fredrickson testified that he had a conversation with
appellant at the clinic on the evening of July 1, 1977,
after appellant had been referred to him by his supervisor

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(T.116,117).

He noted that the conversation was not a

"question answer session" but a "therapy c on t ac t" (T.11 7).
Mr. Fredrickson stated that at that tirne appellant
volunteered to him that he had sexual intercourse with
his two step-daughters (T.118).
The next incident occurred on October 23, 1976,
Appellant was deer hunting in the mountains with his 16
year old step-son.

The boy testified that appellant

came to the 8-man large ten in which he was sleeping in
a sleeping bag and held him and threatened him as he
committed an act of sodomy (T.50-51).

The step-son

testified, "first he put his hand over my mouth.
I came to he was starting to unzip the bag.

When

I began to

squeal about and he smacked me; threatened me. • • • "
(T.67).

Several other adults were sitting around a

campfire outside the tent, drinking, and a cousin of the
victim was asleep in the tent(T.56,67).

When the boy

kicked his cousin and awakened him, appellant rolled
over and pretended to be asleep (T.58).

The boy also

testified that appellant had assaulted him in a similar
manner several times before (T.52).
Joseph Louis Vasquez was with appellant and his
step-son on the hunting trip and testified that the fire was
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50 or 60 feet away from the tent and confirmed the fact

that the adults were drinking around the campfire that
night.

He also noted that there was a truck in front of

the tent (T .127, 128) •
Brian Matsuda, the juvenile probation officer,
testified that when appellant's step-son had told him of
appellant's abuses in June of 1977, the boy had given him
a version of the incident which varied in certain aspects
from the boy's testimony at trial.

Essentially the two

versions conflicted in that Mr. Matsuda stated that the
boy had told him that appellant forced the boy to put his
mouth on appellant's sexual organ rather than that appellant
had placed his mouth on the boy's sexual organ (T.97).
It should be noted, however,

that Mr. Matsuda did not record

or write down any notes at the time of the conversation with
the boy, and that he did not make any notes until some three
days later (T.100).

Additionally, both versions indicated

sexual perversion and forced abuse of· the boy.
The third indicent occurred on March 15, 1977.
Another of appellant's step-daughters, 13 year old Rosie,
testified that her step-father "raped"her on that day.
She stated that her step-father, who was in the home with just
her and her younger sister, took her by the hand into the
bedroom (T.20,21).

Her testimony was that "he took me in

the bedroom and started putting his hands on me and started
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

feeling my chest, and he started getting my pants down
and took my--put me on the bed and took my pants off.

And he put his private in mine and had sexual intercour se. "
(T.21).

The girl further testified that this had happened

many times before when her mother was home, asleep, and
when her mother was away from the home (T..22).
Rosie's mother testified that appellant usually
got up after they had gone to bed and remained up much of
the night (T.36).

She stated that she never got up to

check on the children unless they were sick (T.45), and
that she never checked to see what her husband was doing
(T. 4 7) •

Dr. Lynn Taylor Dayton, a gynecologist, testified
that he had examined Rosie and had concluded that she was
definitely sexually active (T.83,84), and that although
there would be a fair likelihood of pregnancy if appellant
had had intercourse with the girl as often as she said he
had, that likelihood would be higher for an older woman
(T.87).
As noted above, Brian Matsuda, Bobby Joe Fred·
rickson, and Albert Passic all testified that appellant
had admitted sexual abuse or intercourse with his daughters
on separate occasions.
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In his defense, appellant testified that none
of these incidents took place and that he had never
admitted abusing his children (T.164-165).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY VERDICTS.
A

THE CONVICTION OF FORCIBLE SODOMY
rs SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The crimes of sodomy and forcible sodomy are
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1977):
"(l) A person commits sodomy
when he engages in any sexual act
involving the genitals of one person
and the mouth or anus of another
person, regardless of the sex of
either participant.
(2) A person commits forcible
sodomy when he commits sodomy upon
another without the other's consent."
The elements of the crime are thus:
(1) any sexual act involving the genitals of one
and the mouth or anus of another, and
(2) the victim's lack of consent.
Lack of consent is further defined in Utah Code
Ann.

§

76-5-406 (Supp. 1977), which states:

"
• Sodomy is without consent
of the victim • • • [when] the actor
compels the victim to submit or
participate by any threat that would
prevent resistance by a person of
ordinary
resolution."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the instant case, the victim, 16 year 0 ~
Michael Anthony Gene Garcia, testified that the appell
_ ant
came to the tent where he was sleeping on October 23,
1976, and committed sodomy with him, against his will, by
placing his mouth over the victim 1 s penis.

The boy stated

that appellant threatened him, put his hand over his mouth
and held him so that he could not get up (T.51).

On

cross-examination, the witness further testified that
appellant had "smacked" him (T. 67).

When questioned

concerning his cousin, who was sleeping in the same tent,
the victim indicated that he had kicked his cousin, and that'
as his cousin started to awaken, appellant rolled over and
pretended to be asleep (T.58).

Although the victim did stat

that there were other adults around the campfire, 15 to 20
feet away, he noted that they were all drunk at the time
(T.56).

One of those who was at the campfire that night

confirmed the fact that all were drinking and noted that
the fire was 50 or 60 feet from the tent and that a truck wa
in front of the tent (T.128).
As can be seen, the elements of the crime of
forcible sodomy are present.

The credibility and weight

of the boy's testimony, in light of all the other evidence
presented at the trial was a question for the jury to
determine as the trier of fact.
P.2d 66

(Utah 1977).

State v. Wilson, 565

There, the Court noted:
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"The judging of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight of
the evidence is exclusively the
prerogative of the jury." Id. at 68.
Many courts have noted that in cases of sexual
abuse, the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to
support a conviction.

The Arizona Supreme Court has held in

a rape case that:
"A conviction may be had on the
basis of the uncorroborated testimony
of the prosecutrix unless the story
is physically impossible or so incredible
that no reasonable person could believe
it. II
State v. Williams, 111 Ariz. 175, 526 P.2d 714, 716-717
(1974).

See also State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d

81 (1963); and May v. State, 89 Nev. 277, 510 P.2d 1368
(1973).
In State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975),
this Court extended this same standard of review to a sodomy
case.

The court stated:
"To set aside a verdict it must
appear that the evidence was so
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds acting fairly must
have entertained reasonable dou~
that defendant committed the crime."
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 1272.
Appellant's brief cites, at length, evidence from

the trial in an attempt to question the credibility of the
boy's testimony.

However, this Court has indicated that a
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possible weakness in the evidence of the state is not
grounds for reversal.

In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah

110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), cert. denied 355

u.s.

~

848,

2 L.Ed.2d 57, 78 S.Ct. 74 (1957), this Court stated:
"It is to be conceded • • • a
weakness existed in the state's case
from which the jury, had they been so
minded, may well have entertained a
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.
But it is not sufficient merely that
reasonable minds may have entertained
such doubt. Before a verdict may
properly be set aside, it must appear
that the evidence was so inconclusive
or unsatisfactory that reasonable
minds acting fairly upon it must
have entertained reasonable doubt
that defendants committed the crime."
(Emphasis added.)
See also State v. Middelstat, 579 P.2d 908

(Utah 1978);

and State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976).

I t is the

prerogative of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine
the credibility of witnesses.
in this case.

That is what has happened

There was ample evidence for a finding of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
B

THE CONVICTIONS OF RAPE ARE SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 1977), defines
the crime of rape as follows:
"A male person commits rape when he
has sexual intercourse with a female,
not his wife, without her consent."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lack of consent is pertinently defined in the same part
of the Code as being present whenever the victim is under
fourteen years of age.

1977).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406(7)

(Supp.

The elements which just have been established in

the state in this case are that:
(1) a male actor
(2) had sexual intercourse
(3) with a female
( 4) not his wife
(5) under 14 years of age.
Petrita Garcia testified that her step-father,
the appellant, jerked her into a bedroom and had intercourse
with her on September 11, 1975, when she was 12 years old (T.4-6).
She stated that this had happened 20 to 50 times before (T. 7),
and that she complied with his demand because he threatened to
"beat the living heck II out of her if she didn't comply (T. 6) •
Rosie Garcia, Petrita's sister, testified that appellant had intercourse with her, against her will, on March 15,

1977.

She was 12 years old at that time (T.21-21).

She noted

that the same thing had happened many times before, sometimes
when her mother was home, asleep in bed (T.22).

Rosie stated

that she had never told her mother of the acts because
appellant had threatened to kill her (T.32).

Rosie's mother

testified that appellant usually got up after going to bed
(T.36), and would stay up most of the night (T.45).

She stated
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that she never checked on him or went to see what he
was doing (T.47).
Dr. Lynn Dayton, a specialist in the area of
obstetrics and gynecology testified that he had examined
Rosie on October 24, 1977, and that, in his opinion, ~e
was definitely sexually active (T.83,84).
Brian Matsuda, an officer of the Juvenile Court,
testified that the appellant had admitted having sexual
relations with the girls (T.91).

Bobby Joe

Fredricksoo,~

employee of the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic, also
indicated that appellant had admitted having sexual relatic
with his step-daughters (T.118).
Thus, the elements of the crime are firmly
established by the evidence.

Appellant cites State v.

Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865, 868 (1959), to
indicate that a conviction of rape "should be

scruti~z~

with great care because it is a charge easy to make and
hard to defend against."

In that case, the state's

case rested directly upon the testimony of the prosecutrix.
The Court, in affirming the conviction, noted:

-12-
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• • • this offense is rarely
committed in the presence of witnesses
and often the conviction of the guilty
could only be had upon the victim's
testimony.
It has often been held
that if there is nothing inherently
contradictory or incredible in
her story a conviction may rest
upon the victim's testimony alone."
Id. at 868.
As is noted in Wilson and Sullivan, supra,
the weight and credibility of the evidence is for the
trier of fact to determine.

Unless there is such a

lack of evidence that a reasonable doubt is compelled,
the conviction must stand.

In this case there is more

than adequate evidence to indicate guilt.

The verdict

of the jury on these counts should therefore be
upheld.

-13-
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POINT II.
THE T?-I l\L COU1'T PROPEI;LY l\D,i1'1"1'ED
THE TESTIHO:~Y Of:' MR. FRED;-(ICKSOI~,
AN UNLICENSED CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST.

A.
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. FREDRICKSON \-/AS
NOT BARRED BY THE PSYCHOLOGISTPATIENT PRIVILEGE AS STATED IN
U.C.A. § 58-25-8 (1953) AS AMENDED.
Bobby Joe Fredrickson, as clinical psychologist at
the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic, was called by the
prosecution to testify
him by appellant.

as to certain statements made

~

Defense counsel objected to his testirnonj'

on the ground that "a psychologist-patient privilege ought
to exist in the situation"

(Tr. 111).

When it was establishe'.

out of the jury's presence on voir dive examination, that
Mr. Fredrickson was not a licensed psychologist (Tr. 114),
but that there were other licensed psychologists at the Four
Corners Clinic, Defense Counsel asked that the witness be
cautioned to not reveal any information received through thw
licensed psychologists

(Tr. 115, 116).

The trial court noted

that if such information were offered, counsel could object
at that time, but overruled the objection to the evidence
of Mr. Fredrickson's conversation with appellant (Tr· 11 6) ·

-14-
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Later, in the presence of the jury, appellant
a]ain

obj~ctcd

to Mr. Fredrickson's testimony and claimed

that the psychologist-patient privilege should apply because
Mr. Fredrickson was acting as an agent of a licensed psychologist
(Tr. 117).
(U.C.A.

§

The trial court refused to expand the statute
58-25-8,

(1953), as amended) beyond its explicit

wording and overruled the objection.
Appellant claims that the trial court committed
reversible error in allowing Mr. Fredrickson to testify.
In support of that claim, he raises two arguments.

The first,

raised for the first time on appeal, is that since employees
of government agencies are exempted from the state licensing
requirements but may still hold themselves out as psychologists,
they should be treated as licensed psychologists for the
purposes of the psychologist-patient privilege found in
U.C.A.

§

58-25-8, supra.

The second argument, which was

raised at trial, is that Mr. Fredrickson was acting as an
agent of a licensed psychologist and that communications with
an agent of a licensed psychologist should also be privileged
under U.C.A.

§

58-25-8, supra.
EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

It is a generally recognized rule of law that
"where evidence is admitted over the defendant's objections
at trial, no new grounds for objection can be claimed on appeal."
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State v. Craig, 215 Kan.

381, 524 P. 2d 67'1 at 682 ( 19 7JI.

See also In Int·'::est of Oaks, 571 P. 2d 1364 at 1365
(Utah,
1977).
State v. Crace, 260 Or. App. 927, 554 P. 2d
628 at

631 (1976), and Burns v. State, 574 P. 2d 422

(Wyo., 1978),

Only the agency theory argued on appeal by appella:.:
in support of an expansion of the scope of the psychologistpatient privilege was raised at trial.

The additional

theory that government employed psychologists should be
included was not raised at trial and should not now be consic,
Nevertheless, even if the government employee theor:
had been raised at trial, it does not compel an expansion
of the psychologist-patient privilege.
U.C.A. § 53-25-8,

(1953), as amended, states:

"A psychologist licensed under the
provisions of this act cannot, without
the consent of his client or patient,
be examined in a civil criminal action
as to any information acquired in the
course of his professional services
in behalf of the client.
"
[Emphasis added]
As can be seen by the express language of the above
statute, the scope of the psychologist-patient privilege is
very narrow and is limited to licensed psychologists.

In

Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 U. 2d 138, 424 P. 2d 449 (1967),
this court declared several guidelines helpful in interpretins
acts of the legislature:
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1

'fhs ena.ctrnent of the sta~ute
prescribing this procedure is the
legislature prerogative.
It carries
with it the presumptions that it is
valid, and that the words and chrases
were chosen advisely to expres~-the
legislative intent.
The statute
should not be stricken down nor
apnlied other than in accordance with
its literal wording unless it is so
unclear or confused as to be wholly
beyond reason, or inoperable, or it
contravenes some basic constitutional
right.
If it meets these tests it is
not the court's prerogative to consider
its wisdom, or its effectiveness, nor
even the reasonableness or orderliness
of the procedure set forth, but it has
a duty to let it operate as the legislature
has provided.
(Id. at 451)
[Emphasis added]
11

Had the legislature intended to make communications
with unlicensed
done so.

psychologists privileged, they would have

A literal reading of the statute leaves the nature

and scope of the privilege clear.

On the other hand, the

interpretation urged by appellant creates confusion.
U.C.A. § 58-25-6 (1953), as amended, does state:
"Nothing in this act .
(regulating
the practice of psychology)
. shall be
construed to limit the activities, and
use of official title on the part of a
person in the employ of a federal, state,
county, or municipal agency, or other
political subdivision, or a duly chartered
educational institution .
" (Emphasis added)
Appellant contends that this clause exempts government
psychologists from the state licensing requirements.

He

further contends that even though unlicensed, the prohibition
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on te3timony of licensed psychologists

i~

should be extended to them in order to not

§

S3-2 S-8,

SU"r-

~,

h~rnpcr gov 2 r~~

activities.
I

Consis t ent 1 y, i"f appe 1 lant 1 s argument were ado"t-'
t'
0

!;;~I

II

this policy should be uniformly applied in the interpretcti\:'
of § 58-25-6 in total.

That statute goes on to state:

"Nothing in this act shall be
construed to limit the activities and
services of a student, intern, or
resident in psychology, . . . provided
that the person is designated by such
titles as 'psychological intern,'
'psychological trainee,' or other
title clearly indicating such training
status. Nothing in this act shall
be construed as preventing members of
other professions from doing work of a
psychological nature, so long as such
persons do not represent themselves
to the public as being a psychologist,
except when so licensed . .
"
[Emphasis added]
If appellant's theory that the privilege given to
licensed psychologists in

§

58-25-8, supra, is essential to

the activities of anyone practicing psychology; students,
interns, and resident psychologists as well as other professionals seeking to do psychological activity should all
be included within the privilege.

Yet, the statute explicitel

and expressly applies only to licensed psychologists.
In the instant case, there were licensed psychologis
at the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic (Tr. 113).

Given

this access to persons with whom conversation might be held
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confiC~ntial,

limiting the psychologist-patient privilege

to communication with them v:ould not hamper the activities
of the clinic.

On the other hand, to extend the privilege

to anyone connected with the clinic as proposed by appellant
is to completely ignore the explicit statement of Legislative
intent in § SS-25-8, supra.

Respondent urges that such an

interpretation contravenes not only the intent but the clear
meaning of the psychologist-patient privilege.

The trial

court was correct in allowing the testimony of Mr. Fredrickson
once it was determined that he was not a licensed psychologist
(Tr. 110-111).
l'.GEUTS OF LICENSED PSYCHOLOGISTS

Appellant's second theory is that Mr. Fredrickson
was acting as an °agent" of a licensed psychologist and that
the agent's conununication should therefore be equally privileged.
Again, appellant seeks to expand the scope of the statutory
privilege set forth in § 58-2S-8, supra.
Appellant argues that:
"if a certified or licensed
psychologist referred the patient to
another psychologist in the Four Corners
Mental Health Center the credentials
of the referror ought to flow to the
psychologist to whom the patient was
referred."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8).
The record does not indicate that appellant was referred to
Mr. Fredrickson by a licensed psychologist.

Instead, Mr.

Fredrickson indicated that appellant had been referred to
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him by his superior

~ho ~a~

not a

liccns~d

or certified

psychologist (Tr. 121) . 1
Nevertheless, evP.n if appellant had been

referre~

to Mr. Fredrickson by someone whose communications were
privileged under

§

58-25-8, supra, his testimony would not

have been improperly received.

As noted in Gord, supra, the,

statute should be read literally unless doing so renders it
meaningless or unreasonable.
clear on its face.

Section 58-2 5-8,

supr~,

is

The section expressly states the legisk

intent to make only those communications with licensed
psychologists privileged.

Had the legislature intended to

expand the privilege, they would have done so.

Other

courts ,

have limited similar statutes dealing with licensed physiciar.
to their explicit wording.
221 P. 2d 404 at 420 (1950),

State v. Fourquette, 67 Nev. SOi,
and Commonwealth v. Cohen, Hi

Pa. Super. 199, 15 A. 2d 730 at 732(1940).

1

In fairness to the appellant, it should be noted that
the witness did indicate that his superior was a
certified social worker. U .c .A. § 58-35-10, (1953),
as amended, could be interpreted to give a social
worker's testimony a status similar to that of a
licensed psychologist.
However, (1) this privilege
was not claimed by appellant at trial er on appeal
and, (2) the testimony of Mr. Fredrickson as to t~e
qualifications of his superior or other psychologists
at the center is hearsay.
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Finally, an extension of this privilege to all
11

1.1 0

might be acting as "agents" of a licensed psychologist

would make the privilege over-broad and would frustrate the
demands of justice.

Physicians are not restrained by any

privilege in felony matters

(Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule

27 (2)) or in any matter with respect to juvenile abuse

(U.C.A. § 55-16-5 (1953) as amended).

Neither should any

others who are not explicitely identified be bound by such
a privilege.

The trial court, therefore, acted properly and

within the law in refusing to restrict the testimony of Mr.
Fredrickson on an agency theory.
B.
ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF THE
UNLICENSED CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST
AT TRIAL IN THIS CASE WAS JUSTIFIED
UNDER UTAH STATUTES REQUIRING THE
REPORTING OF ABUSE OF ~INORS.
The Supreme court of Washington, in State v. Fagalde,
85 Wash. 2d 730, 539 P. 2d 86 (1975), was faced with a case
which is very similar to the case at hand.

That defendant

had been convicted of assault upon a three year-old child.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court had
erred in admitting the testimonies of the director and an
employee of the Walla Walla Mental Health Center concerning
statements made to them by the defendant while he was seeking
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l

I

I
treatmeni.

The director was not a licensed psychologist

al though he did possess a Ph.D. in psychology.

The employee I

was a therapist, but not a doctor or a psychologist.

'!'he

I
I

trial court held that since neither were licensed psychologi;~

their testimonies were admissible over the defendant's objec':I
The Supreme Court refused to consider whether or
not the defendant could claim the psychologist-patient
privilege even though these witnesses were not licensed
psychologists.

Instead, they noted, first, that confidentiai •

I

communications between doctor and patient are not privileged f
where they relate to child abuse.
§

Revised Code of Washingtor

5.60.060, 1974, states:
"A regular physician or surgeon
shall not, without the consent of his
patient, be examined in a civil action
as to any information acquired in
attending such patient, which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe
or act for the patient, but this
exception shall not apply in any
judicial proceeding regarding a child's
injuries, neglect or sexual abuse,
or the cause thereof."
(Emphasis added)

As the Washington Court stated:
"It will be seen that this
section is not restricted to the case
where the injured child is a patient.
In any proceeding regarding a child's
injuries, the exception does not apply.
Thus, the language covers the situation
where the parent visits a psychiatrist
and reveals that he has subjected his
child to abuse." (Fagalde at 90)
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The court then noted that their child abuse reporting act,
r<.C.'.·!.

§

26.44.04(7) requires:
"that physicians (practitioners)
and psychologists re?ort incidents of
child abuse which come to their attention,
and that they include in the report
[a]ny other information which may
be helpful in establishing the cause
of the child's death, injury, or
injuries and the identity of the
perpetrator of perpetrators."
(Id. at 90).

The court then stated:
"Thus, we cannot accept the
appellant's theory that confidential
communications between the perpetrator
and a psychologist, or a doctor, or
a mental health center employee, are
protected from disclosure and privileged
in a judicial proceeding, according
to the terms of the applicable statutes.
Such protection might well be deemed
to be in the public interest. But it
is evident that, in its recent enactment the legislature has attached
greater importance to the reporting
of incidents of child abuse and the
prosecution of perpetrators than to
counseling and treatment of persons
whose mental or emotional problems cause
them to inflict such abuse . . .
and . .
has expressed an intent
to protect the confidentiality of
communications made in the physicianpatient and psychologist-patient
relationship, except where they relate
to child abuse; and in this area the
interest in discovery of cases of such
abuse and in protecting the child
from future recurrences if found to be
overriding.
Prosecution of the offender
is contemplated and properly incidental
to at least the latter purpose. The
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interest in encouraging the child
abuser to seek treatment is subordinated
to this aim."
(Id. at 90).
Utah's statutes in this area are very sinilar
those of Washington.

~

All persons are required to report

incidents of child abuse and include any information helpful
in establishing the cause of the injuries and identity of
the perpetrator;

U.C.A. § 55-16-2 (1953), as amended, provL[i

"Any person having cause to
believe that a minor has had physical
injury as a result of unusual or
unreasonable physical abuse or neglect
shall report or cause reports to be
made in accordance with the provisions
of this act."
U.C.A.

§

55-16-3 (1953), as amended, provides:
"
Such reports shall contain
the name and address-of the minor, if
known by the person making the report,
and any other information the person
making the report believes might be
helpful in establishing the cause of
the injuries and identity of the perpetrator."

The physician-patient privilege is also not applicable in
child abuse cases in Utah as well as in Washington.
§

U.C.A.

55-16-5 (1953), as amended, reads:
"The physician-patient privilege
shall not be a ground for excluding
evidence regarding the minor's injuries
or cause thereof in any proceeding
resulting from a report made in good
faith pursuant to this act."
(Child Abuse
Reporting Act)
[Emphasis added]
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~s

with the Washington statute, a careful reatlinq

of this statute clearly indicates that it is not restricted
to instances where the child is the patient.

It applies to

any oroceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to
title 55 chapter 16 of the Utah Code.

The instant pro-

secution arose from such a report (Tr. 95).
Thus, while psychologists are required to report
any information regarding abuse of minors pursuant to U.C.A.
§

55-16-1, et seq., on the other hand, Section 58-25-8

inconsistently makes any information acquired by licensed
clinical psychologists in the course of their professional
services privileged.

Given the fact that physician-patient

communications, which would include psychiatrist-patient
communications, is not privileged in child abuse cases,
a fortiori similar communications involving psychologists
should not be privileged and should be admissible.

Therefore,

in the instant case, the trial court's ruling admitting the
testimony of the clinical psychologist was consistent with
this sound public policy and should be sustained.
POINT III.
ALL FIVE COUNTS AGAINST APPELLANT
WERE PROPERLY BROUGHT IN ONE
INFORMATION.
U.C.A. § 77-21-31, 1953 as amended, states:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated -25OCR, may contain errors.

"Two or more offenses may be
charged in the same indictment
or information in a separate count
for each offense if the offenses
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same
or similar character or are based
on the same act or transaction or
on two or more acts or transactl.Ons
connected together or constituting
parts of a common sc:heme or plan."
[Emphasis added]
Appellant urges a narrow interpretation of this
statute and cites several Oregon cases to indicate that
several offenses may be charged in one indictment only when
they arise out of the same act or transaction, meaning

wh~

they are closely linked in time, place, and circumstances.
The Oregon statute involved, however, is much narrower than
its Utah counterpart.

The Oregon statute provides:

"The indictment must charge but
one crime, and one form only,
except that:
(1) Where the crime may be
committed by the use of different
means, the indictment may allege
the means in the alternative.
(2)
When there are several
charges against any person or persons
for the same act or transaction,
instead of having several indictments,
the whole may be joined in one indictment in several counts.
.
"
Oregon Revised Statutes § 132.560, 1953
as amended.
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Utah. unlike Oregon, not only allows one indictment to
charge a defendant with two or more offenses when they arise
from the same act or transaction, but also where they are
of the "same or similar character" or where they are "connected
together" or "constitute parts of a common scheme or plan."
In the instant case, appellant was charged in
one information with one count of forcible sodomy, two counts
of rape, and two counts of forcible sexual abuse.

In this

case particularly, all five counts charged appellant with
acts of the same or similar character which were connected
as part of a common pattern.
All of these offenses are found within part 4 of
section 5 of the criminal code entitled "Sexual Abuse".
(Specifically§§ 76-5-402,

403 and 404).

Each of the acts

charged involved abuse of the genitals of appellant's
stepchildren.

There were incestuous overtones in each count.

lfuile it is true that the forcible sodomy count involved the
step-son and the other counts involved step-daughters, the
same type of sexual abuse, i.e., forcible misuse and manipulation
of the genitals was charged in each count.

The testimony at

trial indicated repeatedly that the specific incidents listed
in the information were part of an on-going pattern of abuse
inflicted upon these three children.

(Tr. 7, 22, 25, 52, 53).
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Thus, the offenses charged in this case were oot
only of a similar character, but were connected together

il

could also be considered part of a general pattern of chib
abuse.

The information, therefore, properly charged appel;•

with all five counts.

CONCLUSION
Sufficient evidence establishing each of the

ele~:

of the er imes of which appellant was convicted was presente:
at trial.

The issue on appeal with respect to sufficiency

of. the evidence is not whether a reasonable doubt may have
existed, but whether a reasonable doubt is

comp~lled.

in the latter instance should a jury verdict be
upon a claim of insufficient evidence.
supra.)

~~

overturn~

(State v. Sullivan,

In this case, the evidence clearly exceeds the

requisite standard and the jury verdicts should stand.
The trial court was correct in allowing the testim:
of Mr. Fredrickson, the unlicensed psychologist.

Psychologi:

patient communication is explicitely privileged only when
the psychologist is licensed by the state.

Moreover, the

privilege does not extend to situations involving child
abuse.
Finally, the several counts charged in the
information were all for sexual abuse crimes.

All were ofa
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sirailar character and were conne8ted together in a general
pattern of sexual child abuse.

The trial court acted properly

in allowing each of the counts to proceed on the same
inforMation.
?or these reasons, Respondent urges that the
convictions are sound and that the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
-29-may contain errors.

